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 Political interpretations of the past serve different purposes: they 
are the source of collective identities that distinguish “us” and 
“them”, they mobilize support for political leaders as well as negative 
emotions against political adversaries. In the post-Yugoslav states 
political uses of history by political elites played an important role in 
their nationalist policies which ultimately produced violent conflicts 
and war. This outcome has been rather exceptional in comparison to 
the dynamics of nationalism in other two dissolving post-communist 
federations. The author examines several explanations of this excep-
tionalism and argues that the strength of nationalism and intensity of 
nationalist conflicts among the ex-Yugoslav nations can be explained 
by the unfavourable historical conditions of nation- and state-building 
and by different elite strategies. A comparison of nationalist dis-
courses and political strategies of Serb, Croatian and Slovene 
political elites reveals significant differences which led to different 
outcomes. 
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1. Nationalism and history in Eastern Europe 
 In the region that historically belonged to Yugoslavia and that today en-
tails six Yugoslav successor states, with a seventh one (Kosovo) probably 
emerging from the remainders of the Yugoslav federation, historical memo-
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ries and politically interpreted images of the past used to play an extremely 
important role, and they still do today. The recent Yugoslav wars – the first 
large scale armed conflict in Europe since 1945 – seemed very much deter-
mined by this historical consciousness and political ideologies which are in-
spired by it. Today again competing interpretations of the past forwarded by 
national political and intellectual elites decisively determine, on the one 
hand, the ways in which responsibility for the wars and the crimes commit-
ted in the wars is understood in the region and, on the other hand, the claims 
by which different national groups justify their state- and institution-building 
goals. If we look for evidence which supports this thesis, we will find many 
examples from recent past as well as from present-day politics. One of the 
best known instances of the political use of the past for mobilizing political 
support and strengthening national identification is the famous speech of the 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević at Gazimestan (Kosovo) in 1989. On the 
occasion of the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle 
against Ottoman Turks, on June 28, 1989, Milošević gave a political speech 
in which he, among others, stated: 
“Today, six centuries later, we are once again in battles, and facing 
battles. They are not armed battles, although the possibility of those 
cannot be excluded. But, regardless of what they are like, battles can-
not be won without determination, courage, self-sacrifice, without 
those good traits that were present on the Kosovo field a long time 
ago.”1 
 Milošević’s rhetoric served two purposes at the same time: it was a mo-
bilizing message to his supporters, an appeal to all ethnic Serbs to follow 
Serbian leadership and rely on the long and virtuous tradition of solidarity 
and sacrifice, symbolized by the Kosovo battle (but also avoid disunity 
which Milošević portrayed as the main reason for the Serb defeat in 1389); 
on the other hand, it was a clear warning and a threat to all political adver-
saries of Milošević, but also to all non-Serbs, that a war “…cannot be ex-
cluded” if they do not comply with Milošević’s demands. 
 There are numerous illustrations of such an instrumental political use of 
the past from other parts of former Yugoslavia – although perhaps not as 
rhetorically impressive as Milošević’s speech – which served similar pur-
poses. 
 The first Croatian President, Franjo Tuđman, himself a historian, won the 
first free elections in Croatia on a programme which exploited common 
places of a nationalist interpretation of Croatian history. He described Croats 
as “one of the oldest European nations” and declared the establishment of an 
 
1 Cited in Vujačić 2004: 31. 
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independent Croatian state as the necessary outcome of a “millennial strug-
gle” of the Croatian people. At the same time, the ideology of Yugoslavism, 
originally a Croatian creation, was condemned as a fatal political error of the 
founding fathers of the Croatian national movement. The reference to history 
was so important for Tuđman that he personally wrote the historical parts in 
the Preamble of the Croatian Constitution, with a long account of events 
which led to the establishment of the Republic of Croatia.2 
 Another and more recent example from Croatia demonstrates the con-
tinuity of strategies based on political uses of historical memories and their 
relevance for contemporary Croatian politics. Different policies of remem-
bering the past can be pursued by various political players, not only by re-
gimes. They can become the source of political conflict and can serve to un-
derpin the legitimacy of one’s own political position, while de-legitimizing 
the position of the political opponents. Every year in spring two exercises in 
symbolic politics, based on interpretations of historical events from World 
War II, are staged in Croatia and receive great public attention. On April 22 
the Croatian political elites – together with parts of civil society – com-
memorate the escape of a last surviving group of prisoners from Jasenovac, 
the biggest concentration camp of the fascist Independent State of Croatia, 
and honour the victims of the camp. Three weeks later, on May 15, an alter-
native commemoration is organized in Bleiburg/Austria, where Yugoslav 
partisan army captured the fleeing Croatian fascists and their homeland 
army, together with numerous civilians, and massacred a yet unknown num-
ber of them3. This later event is organized by different right wing associa-
 
2 The Preamble of the Croatian Constitution begins with the following statement: “Express-
ing the millennial identity of the Croatia nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by 
the course of its entire historical experience within different forms of states and by the preser-
vation and growth of the state-formative idea, founded on the historical right of the Croatian 
nation to full sovereignty, manifested in: – the formation of Croatian principalities in the sev-
enth century; – the independent mediaeval state of Croatia founded in the ninth century; – the 
Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century; [… a list of 12 more items follows, N.Z.], 
the Croatian nation by its freely expressed will at the first democratic elections (1990) reaf-
firmed its millennial statehood. (...) Considering the presented historical facts and (…) the in-
alienable and indivisible, non-transferable and non-exhaustible right of the Croatian nation to 
self-determination and state sovereignty, (…) the Republic of Croatia is established as the na-
tional state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of autochthonous national mi-
norities” [emphasis N.Z.].  
3 In both cases there are bitter controversies about the number of victims. While it seems 
that the scholars increasingly agree on an estimate of 80-100 thousand killed in the Jasenovac 
concentration camp, there is no scholarly consensus on the number of killed in Bleiburg: most 
realistic are estimates that 30-50 thousand were killed on the spot (Žerjavić 1992)., but the total 
number of Croatian victims of Partisan retaliation at the end of the war is estimated to be higher, 
by some calculations it might have been as high as 200 or more thousand killed. As for the par-
ticipants in the memorial events, it is characteristic that no representatives of the Catholic 
Church participate in the commemoration in Jasenovac. 
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tions and parties, but regularly enjoys the support of the Catholic Church in 
Croatia through a designated bishop who participates in the ceremony, and 
the commemoration takes place under the auspices of the Croatian parlia-
ment, with one of the vice-presidents of the parliament addressing the par-
ticipants in Bleiburg.  
 A final example may be taken from the most topical case: the struggle 
between Serbs and Albanians over the question, whose claims to Kosovo are 
more justified. It is interesting that both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, apart 
from demographic (ethnic composition), democratic (demand to freely de-
cide the status of Kosovo by its citizens on a referendum) and legal argu-
ments (whether or not the Autonomous Province Kosovo in the former 
Yugoslav federation was already a quasi-state), also employ a range of his-
torical arguments, which range from medieval times, or even antiquity, to 
the recent history of the Balkan wars and the two World Wars. 
 Is this practice of using historical arguments for political purposes an ex-
ception typical for the Yugoslav successor states? Of course it is not. We 
know that every nationalist discourse includes historical narratives and 
modes of incorporating memories of the past into the self-image of a nation 
that it produces. But it seems that the obsession with the past is typical for 
East European nationalisms: the national discourse is predominantly focused 
on uncovering and commemorating past injustice that one’s own nation ex-
perienced in the past and that was caused by regimes or members of other 
nations (Schöpflin 2003). To illustrate this we may recall two recent events 
which happened in Eastern Europe. 
 The Polish vetting law has recently produced a deep political cleavage in 
the society and divided parties and societal groups on the question, how to 
practice lustration of those responsible for injustice and repression under 
communism. The communist system and its repression are regarded as a 
criminal endeavour and – since it was installed from outside – it is also 
treated as an essentially antinational regime. Therefore the law seeks to re-
store justice by labelling and excluding from public life those responsible for 
the systemic repression: members of communist secret services and their 
collaborators.4 
 The other example is the Estonian controversy over the Soviet soldier 
monument.5 In this case it is even more evident what determines the contra-
dictory positions vis-à-vis the communist system in Estonia: while the titular 
nation (Estonians) sees the incorporation of Estonia into Soviet Union at the 
end of WW 2 as occupation, and thus cannot have a positive attitude towards 
 
4 Cf. for instance Ramonet 2007. 
5 Cf. BBC news, 27. 4. 2007. 
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the symbols commemorating this event, the Russian minority understands 
the very same event as the main fundament of the legitimacy of communism 
in Soviet Union: its victory over Nazism. The positions seem irreconcilable 
because they reflect two different and mutually exclusive processes of na-
tion-building. 
 But although the later case very much resembles controversies over po-
litical interpretation of historical memories in the dissolving Yugoslavia and 
the states that emerged out of it, we can immediately recognize the most 
striking difference: apart from minor clashes with the police (in the early 
1990s and again in 2007), Estonian-Russian disputes did not produce violent 
conflicts, while the Yugoslav nationalisms resulted in several wars and large 
scale ethnic cleansing. 
 Why has the dynamics of nationalist controversies in Yugoslavia been so 
extremist and violent? Why it was not possible, unlike in the Czechoslovak 
and Soviet case, to peacefully dissolve the common state and channel all the 
controversies and contested issues into non-violent procedures and institu-
tions? 
 
2. Explaining the politics of memory in Yugoslav successor 
states: nation-building and state-building in the late 20th 
century 
 I will briefly discuss some theoretical answers given as explanations of 
Yugoslav exceptionalism and will than present in greater detail an explana-
tion that combines several elements in order to portray a rather complex 
picture. It is my firm understanding that simple explanations of the Yugoslav 
exceptionalism – as elegant and attractive they may appear to social scien-
tists – are wrong. 
 The first approach rests on a “civilizational” or cultural argument and 
points at ethno-cultural or even anthropological factors in order to explain 
the traits of Balkan nationalisms. According to this argument, there is a long 
history of violent conflicts between the ethnic groups who live on the same 
or neighbouring territories that belonged to the Yugoslav state.6 This tradi-
tion of conflict and violence has produced a specific “cultural syndrome” 
which turned the conflicts that could otherwise be peacefully resolved into 
war and excessive violence against the members of the adversary ethnic 
group. 
 
6 See for example some of the arguments in Cohen 1993 and Kaplan 1993. Critical evalua-
tion of the argument is given in Sekulić et al. 2004. 
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 Another approach proposes the argument about the preponderance of na-
tionalism.7 Unfinished nation-building processes were only temporarily post-
poned during the socialist regime; the legitimacy crisis of socialism resulted 
in the demise of socialist ideology and the rise of the old currents of nation-
alist ideology. It also became clear during the 1960s that a supranational or 
combined Yugoslav identity could not substitute the national identities of the 
constituent nations; even the peoples with an unfinished nation-building 
process (Bosnian Moslems, Macedonians, Montenegrines) experienced a 
rise of national awareness since the 1970s. 
 Similar to the previous approach, although with a slightly different em-
phasis, is the argument about the political elites as nationalist “political en-
trepreneurs”8. Political elites act as political entrepreneurs; they adopt ide-
ologies and design political programmes according to the circumstances. 
Thus under conditions of a legitimacy crisis of the socialist ideology, the in-
cumbent elites may adopt an alternative and more promising ideology, by 
which it can mobilize the necessary support. This is what happened with 
Slobodan Milošević in the League of Communists of Serbia in the late 
1980s. Alternatively, if the ruling elite is dogmatic or unable to initiate the 
ideological change for any other reason, thus being unable to grasp a more 
effective ideological framework and offer a new political programme, 
counter-elites will emerge as “political entrepreneurs” that exploit the most 
effective ideological instruments for mass mobilization. This is what e.g. 
happened in Croatia as a result of the threat by the Serb nationalism of 
Milošević and his mobilization of the Serb minority in Croatia. 
 Finally, there is the argument about “subversive institutions” of the so-
cialist regimes in general, and of the socialist federations (Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) in particular (Bunce 1999). Socialist institu-
tions generated their own demise and collapse because they became in-
creasingly dysfunctional with increasing complexity and modernization of 
society. The institutions of socialist federations were initially designed to 
control and channel ethnic politics of the constituent nations by the central 
communist elite. Under changed conditions, however, they became tools in 
the hands of the ethnic political elites. A special version of this argument has 
been forwarded for the Yugoslav case (and enjoyed much support in Ser-
bia)9: the blame for the emergence of disintegrative nationalisms was put on 
the Yugoslav 1974 Constitution, which established quasi-confederative in-
 
7 Cf. as a general outline of this argument (for the whole Eastern Europe) Roeder 1999. 
8 As a general theoretical proposition cf. Offe 1994; the argument is, at least partly, applied 
on the Serbian case in Gagnon 1995 and Pavlović 2001; Malešević 2002 applies the thesis on 
the Serbian and Croatian cases. 
9 Cf. for example the arguments in Veljačić 1996b. 
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stitutions with inbuilt excessive veto-powers, inevitable decision deadlocks 
and fostered further centrifugal and secessionist tendencies. 
 Apart from the first approach, which I consider entirely wrong as an ex-
planation for either the character of nationalism or the causes of violent con-
flict, the other three approaches certainly bring forward some good argu-
ments. I agree that the character of nationalist ideologies and actions in the 
former Yugoslavia is to some degree determined by each of these factors: 
specific nationalist traditions which survived socialism, unfinished processes 
of nation-building in some of the South Slav nations, strategies of political 
elites who mobilized nationalism (in order to preserve or to gain power), 
failure of the institutions of the Yugoslav socialist federation, which proba-
bly didn’t cause the emergence of nationalism, but contributed to the state 
collapse through their ineffectiveness and inability to channel and resolve 
conflicts. However, a more adequate explanation requires more complexity, 
that is, we need to combine several factors. Again, the point is not to advo-
cate eclecticism, but to recognize a specific sequence of events and to under-
stand the interconnection of different factors. In what follows I offer an out-
line of the argument about the causes of the emergence of Yugoslav extrem-
ist and history-obsessed nationalisms which led to the war. 
 My first thesis is that the nation-building and state-building processes 
among the South Slav nations that formed Yugoslavia were predominant vis-
à-vis other fundamental processes that shaped these societies during the last 
century and half (modernization, industrialization, economic growth, social 
reform, democratization) in a way that is hardly present in any other part of 
Europe.10 In fact, in both Yugoslav states authoritarian or communist mod-
ernization was only an instrument used by the elites of individual nations in 
Yugoslavia to accomplish national integration and establish own nation-
states. 
 There are several reasons why the problems of nation-building and state-
building were so particularly difficult and why their solution was not suc-
cessfully achieved in the 20th century (and indeed, the processes have still 
not been completed, as the unresolved status of Kosovo and the unstable po-
litical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina show): 
1. Unfavourable geopolitical conditions: The region was historically a zone 
of contact between two empires (Habsburg and Ottoman), complicated 
by a strong involvement of the Venetian Republic and historical memo-
ries or institutional remnants of independent medieval Croatian and Ser-
bian political entities. The dissolution of the empires resulted in territo-
rial claims of the neighbouring nations (Italians, Hungarians, Austrian 
 
10 Perhaps the Irish case with the still unresolved question of Northern Ireland is to a certain 
extent similar to the Yugoslav experience. 
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Germans), which threatened to cut off significant parts of territory in-
habited by South Slavs. 
2. Extreme differences in the level of economic development: By the end of 
the Yugoslav state in the late 1980s ratio between Slovenia and Kosovo 
in terms of economic output per capita was still 6:1 despite decades of 
development in the common state and considerable transfers of resources 
to underdeveloped regions. 
3. Great cultural heterogeneity on a relatively small territory, mainly in 
terms of coexistence of Catholic and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, 
and the necessity to combine three distinct historical legal traditions, the 
Habsburg, the Ottoman and the Venetian (with traces of even older cus-
tom law and kinship institutions in the mountainous and border areas). 
4. Dual process of nation-building (de facto until 1980s, or at least until 
1970s): Yugoslavism and Yugoslav identity developed simultaneously to 
the particular national identities of the Yugoslav constitutive nations. 
This dualism was probably stronger than in the other two East European 
states which also pursued a similar goal of developing a synthetic com-
mon national identity, while at the same time promoting particularistic 
identities of the constituent nations, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 
5. An additional problem with the common Yugoslav identity was that it 
was essentially based on a romantic nationalist idea of South Slav lin-
guistic and cultural proximity and solidarity against its bigger 
neighbouring non-Slav nations, who were perceived as threat to own as-
pirations for statehood and cultural distinctiveness. This was the reason 
why ideology of Yugoslavism could hardly appeal to the non-Slav mi-
norities, and with the growing number of Albanians, who demanded 
equal treatment as the constituent South Slav nation, the integrative for-
mula became increasingly dysfunctional. Another consequence of the 
primacy of cultural and ideological elements in the construction of 
Yugoslav identity was the neglect and weakness of political institutions. 
6. Nation-building and state-building processes of different South Slav na-
tions evolved at different pace: while nation-building of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes was more or less completed at the beginning of the 20th 
century, Macedonians started to build a new identity that is clearly dis-
tinct from Bulgarian only after the World War 2, Bosnian Moslems be-
gan to establish their national consciousness that was not reduced merely 
to religious identity in the 1970s and Montenegro remained deeply di-
vided over the issue of their national identity. 
7.  In the long run (and unlike Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union) there was 
no hegemonic nation that could successfully keep its dominant position: 
While there is no doubt that Serbs had the aspiration to play the role of 
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the hegemonic nation, in both Yugoslav states they were unable to 
maintain this claim successfully. Unlike Soviet Union, which was a 
transformed Russian Empire, Yugoslavia was not a small Serbian empire 
but a genuine new political project, based on contradictory goals of its 
stakeholders. This perhaps could have been an advantage that would 
strengthen the cohesion among the South Slavs, but it was ultimately not 
accepted by the Serbs. 
 My second thesis is that in analyzing the dynamics of social and political 
processes – and here the focus is on the nation-building and state-building of 
the constitutive peoples of former Yugoslavia – we can observe the follow-
ing sequence of steps that determines the relationship between structure and 
agency: historically given conditions (some of which I described above) are 
perceived by the social and political actors as “problems” and “challenges” 
against which they conceive their strategies and programmes and carry out 
their actions. In order to stabilize action the actors establish arrangements 
and institutions that eventually become effective. Both implemented strate-
gies and established arrangements/institutions produce consequences, which 
accumulate to become new conditions that the next generation of social and 
political actors has to deal with. It is important to stress that “action” is not 
only practical but also discursive: ideologies as general orientations of action 
and programmatic discourses of the political elites constitute different dis-
cursive arenas. On the one hand there is a political discourse in which all 
political processes are embedded. It is predominantly (although not exclu-
sively) determined by political elites and it is transmitted mainly through 
nation-wide media. The societal discourse, on the other hand, is constituted 
by the communicative processes in the civil society, which go on both on 
national and the local levels. Both discourses are very important for the dy-
namics of nationalism and the processes of national integration that are in 
the focus of my analysis. They also can explain how such phenomena as 
“politics of memory” and political uses of history emerge and become 
prominent in political life. Here I will give a brief outline of a possible way 
to apply these analytical tools on the dynamics of the three nationalisms that 
played a crucial role in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia: Serb, Croat 
and Slovenian. I will try to show how political elites of these three nations 
defined the problems they were faced with, what strategies of action they 
chose and what consequences they produced. 
 The actions and discourses of the Serbian political elites since mid 1980s 
were characterized by the following features (cf. Vujačić 1996a, 2004, Pav-
lović 2001): 
1. Serbia was identified with Yugoslavia or at least seen as its backbone. 
Milošević exploited this dualism ever since he seized power and contin-
ued to do so even in the late 1990s. It has been rightly pointed out (Vuja-
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čić 2004) that he never changed his rhetoric to simple extremist talk 
about Greater Serbia (although of course he did use nationalist argu-
ments). It also gave the ruling communists the opportunity to take over 
the control over federal army. If Yugoslavia was jeopardized by seces-
sionist republics (Slovenia and Croatia), there was a wide consensus 
among political elites (in power and in opposition) that the Serb minority 
living in other Yugoslav republics (mainly Croatia and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina) had the right to stay in the common state with Serbia and take away 
parts of the territory of the secessionist republics. 
2. The Serb minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia was mobilized for 
the concept of a recentralized (and Serb dominated) Yugoslavia and/or 
Greater Serbia. The main discursive instrument of mobilization was the 
equalization of the new independent Croatian state with the Croatian fas-
cist state during the World War 2 – hence the importance of the political 
uses of historical memories pertaining to WW 2. 
3. The unequal status of Serbia in Yugoslavia was argued by the fact that it 
was the only republic to have Autonomous Provinces, which have after 
1967 become de facto independent from the Serbian government. It is 
well known how Milošević crushed opposition in the provinces and sub-
ordinated them to Serbian centre. While this didn’t provoke much resis-
tance in Vojvodina with its Serb ethnic majority, it led to the deepening 
of conflict in Kosovo. At no point before the NATO intervention against 
Serbia in 1999 were Serbian political elites ready to negotiate about sub-
stantial autonomy for the Kosovo Albanians. They are ready to negotiate 
now, but it is too late, because Albanians don’t want anything less than 
independence. 
4. Serbian political elites were convinced that it is in Serb interest to use 
violence against political enemies in Yugoslavia: Albanians, Slovenes, 
Croats and Bosnians. However, there was not much willingness to take 
the responsibility for the consequences of the use of violence. 
5. The main conflict between Milošević and the Serbian opposition was 
about democracy, while there were no significant differences on the 
question of national policy of establishing Greater Serbia. Despite the un-
fulfilled demands for democracy, this circumstance has given Milošević 
the legitimacy basis to stay in power until 2000. The opposition was able 
to defeat Milošević in elections and remove him from power only after 
his nationalist programme failed. 
6. While Serbia has lost all the wars that it has waged (in Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo), and has already paid a high price in economic 
decline, NATO bombing and influx of Serbian refugees, it seems that 
neither political elites nor the society are yet prepared to face the respon-
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sibility for the disastrous consequences of the Serbian politics. A critical 
distance from the past nationalist ideology, which would change both 
political and societal discourses, is still not visible. 
 In Croatia the main features of elite strategies and discourse were quite 
different from those in Serbia: 
1. In the 1980s Croatian politics was blocked by the balance of power be-
tween reformers and hardliners, the latter were also strengthened by the 
veto-power of the Serb ethnic minority representatives in the League of 
Communists of Croatia. Political change became possible because of an 
external pressure: the threat by the Milošević regime and the Serb na-
tional movement on the one hand, and the demonstration effect of the 
crumbling communist regimes on the other. The first elections (unlike 
Serbia, but similarly as in all Central European countries) resulted in the 
change of government: the ruling communists were replaced by a nation-
alist party that pursued the programme of Croatian national independence 
with determination. 
2. The initial structure of political consensus between the political elites in 
government and opposition was the exact opposite from that in Serbia: 
while there was basic agreement on the desirability of liberal democracy, 
there was no agreement about the state-building goal (reformed commu-
nists at first didn’t support full Croatian independence). With the intensi-
fication of conflict into a full-scale war the consensus among Croatian 
political elites was reached also on the question of state independence. 
However, at the same time the representatives of the Serb minority in 
Croatia were (self-)excluded from this agreement. During this period the 
manipulative political uses of history were widely endorsed by both con-
flicting sides, the nationalist Croatian regime and the leaders of the in-
surgent Serb minority in Croatia. 
3. The Croatian nationalist government in the 1990s is responsible for two 
main political mistakes in the context of war and deterioration of inter-
ethnic (Croat-Serb) relations. Firstly, it encouraged and sometimes even 
actively supported hostilities toward the Serb minority in Croatia, which 
resulted in a rapid change of attitudes towards the Serbs.11 As a conse-
quence, many Serb citizens outside the areas affected by war also left 
Croatia. Secondly, the government pursued a strategy of dividing Bosnia-
Herzegovina and was seeking an agreement between Croats and Serbs on 
 
11 Cf. Šiber 1997 on the increasing ethnic distance vis-a-vis Serbs at the beginning of 
1990s. However, an analysis of the change of media reporting in early 1990s has shown that 
war itself had much more impact on the attitudes towards the Serbs than the political propa-
ganda (cf. Zakošek 2000). 
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this issue. Only after a heavy international pressure it was forced to 
abandon this policy. 
4. In the domestic politics the nationalist government blocked democratic 
consolidation and produced a deficient economic system, which was per-
ceived by the losers of transition as very unjust. Because of these mis-
takes nationalists were voted out of government in January 2000.  
5. Since 2000 Croatian politics experienced gradual moderation and democ-
ratic consolidation. However, one of the main problems today is that the 
societal discourse didn’t follow the democratic turn of the political dis-
course and remained strongly polarized. 
 The Slovenian experience with state-building and democratization again 
was substantially different from Serb and Croatian experiences. The Slove-
nian politics, and in particular the political and societal discourses since 
1985 display features which explain why state-building was successful and 
quick consolidation of democracy was possible: 
1. An early political consensus emerged on the goals of national independ-
ence and liberal democracy in the 1980s between the reformist commu-
nist and the opposition. This is also the reason why during the formative 
years of Slovenian state-building and democratization no divisive “poli-
tics of historical memory” was pursued by major political actors (al-
though these topics were addressed by intellectual elites). 
2. Despite the ten days war in 1991, Slovenia didn’t have any lasting conse-
quences of this conflict. Slovenia was able to achieve its national inde-
pendence at a quite low price. However, the main losers of this transition 
were immigrants from other Yugoslav republics in Slovenia who were 
not given Slovenian citizenship.  
3. In the 1990s the crucial role in the Slovenian politics was played by the 
Liberal party, which was able to successively (or simultaneously) form 
governments with parties left and right of centre and thus promote con-
sensual democratic politics and a moderate form of political competition. 
4. Since Slovenia joined the EU a change was visible in the Slovenian poli-
tics from a consensus model to a more confrontational and polarized one. 
This shows that political and societal discourses remain open to change 
by initiatives of the “political entrepreneurs”. In this context it is not sur-
prising that instrumental uses of certain historical topics by political el-
ites (WW2 communist crimes, responsibility for the repression during 
communism, lustration) re-emerge.  
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3. Final remarks: from analysis of the past to lessons for the 
future 
 The political and social actors in former Yugoslavia – elites as well as 
social movements, associations and other members of civil society – were 
confronted with difficult challenges during the 20th century concerning the 
major processes of social and political change, among which nation- and 
state-building was given the highest priority. Under these conditions they 
produced a great variety of strategies, some of which proved successful, and 
some self-defeating and self-destructive. Probably the most self-defeating 
was the strategy of Serb political elites. An extremely important question in 
normative terms is how this experience can be transformed into a historical 
consciousness that will not become instrumental for some future extremist 
policies. 
 Of course, in dealing with the burden of recent history one could look at 
the examples of Germany and Japan. However, these two states, with their 
unique situation after World War 2 – characterized by total military defeat, 
unilateral ascription of guilt and responsibility for the war crimes (which 
was ultimately accepted by the political and societal elites) and an externally 
imposed re-education policies – cannot serve as a model for other post-con-
flict regimes like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia or Kosovo. It is rather 
necessary for the post-conflict societies themselves – although assisted by 
international actors (such as ICTY) – to develop policies of dealing with the 
past, both of correcting injustice and developing an understanding of recent 
history that is not irreconcilable with the views and interests of minorities 
and neighbouring nations. 
 A starting set of recommendations of how to proceed could encompass at 
least the following elements: 
1. It is necessary to resolve the remaining state-building and institutional is-
sues on the basis of universal principles that will equally be applied to all 
cases and involved parties: this is important for all cases, from the ques-
tion of the status of Kosovo, functioning of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
state and ethnic power-sharing mechanisms for the Albanian minority in 
Macedonia to the issues of the return of Serb refugees to Croatia and 
protection of minority rights in Serbia and Slovenia. 
2. It will serve justice to establish specialized institutions to deal with the 
questions of individual responsibility for war crimes, for example 
through special and competent courts (assisted by other parts of the judi-
ciary) in the countries where these crimes were committed.  
3. The important task for political elites is to reform their political dis-
course: it is crucial for politicians to become able to acknowledge and 
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morally label the self-defeating strategies of the past (“Vergangenheits-
bewältigung” by elites). 
4. Final (but not the least important) point is to support the self-investiga-
tive and critical societal discourses through research, education and pub-
lic debates: it is necessary to open up space for societal actors who would 
be able to cope with the nationalist legacies and their instrumental and 
manipulative “politics of memory”. 
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